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THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION
ARDENT controversy has exaggerated the practical importance of the privi-
lege against self incrimination, and distorted the reality of its actual effect.
A common fallacy underlying many attempts to evaluate the privilege has
been a disposition to regard it as a unity,' rather than a group of evidentiary
1. The privilege has been attacked and defended without attempting to distinguish
its -.rarying effect in different situations. See Boiarsky, The Right of the Accused in a
Criminal Case Not to be Compelled to be a Witness Against Himself (1923, 1929) 35 IV.
VA. L. Q. 27, 126; Brunken, Making the Accused Testily Against Himself (1920) 5
IARQ. L. REv. 82; Carman, A Pica for Withdrawal of Constitutional Privilege from
the Criminal (1938) 22 MIN. L. RE'. 200; Knox, Self Incrimination (1925) 74 U. or
PA. L. Rav. 139; Terry, Constitutional Provisions Against Forcing Self Icrimtination
(1906) 15 YALE L. 3. 127; Comments, Archaic Constitutional Prvisions Protecting the
Accused (1914) 5 J. Cmn. LAw & CRi. 16, Some Reasons for the Grouing Disrespect
for the Law (1911) 1 3. Crim. LAW & Cnmt. 96S, (1937) 27 3. CRa.. Lw & Cnmn. 746.
Other critics have shown more moderation and objectivity. See Rapacz, Rules Goverring
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rules clustered under the aegis of a constitutional phrase. 2 Distinct situations
which the privilege may affect are divisible into three broad categories: the
position of the defendant in a criminal trial, the rights of a witness in any
proceeding and the specialized problems raised by investigatory proceedings.
I.
The option of the accused in a criminal trial to refuse to testify against
himself is traditionally the primary aspect of the privilege. This situation
fits most readily into the typical constitutional phraseology. Around it has
waxed great controversy. 4 Yet in practical effect it seems to be one of the
least important of any of the situations in which the privilege is brought to
bear.
Until late in the last century, the privilege of the accused not to testify
against himself was coupled with a corresponding disability to testify in his
own behalf. Obviously therefore, no inference could be drawn from the
necessity of his remaining aloof. The enabling legislation which made him
a competent witness generally provided that he need not testify at all, and
that no presumption arise against him for failure to offer himself as a witness.5
Yet if the accused once takes the stand, the fiction of waiver generally oper-
ates to leave him completely bereft of the option of refusal to answer in-
criminating questions, so long as they are otherwise admissible.
In effect, the prisoner at bar is thus faced with a choice of remaining silent
while evidence of guilt is perfected before his and the jury's eyes, or taking
the Allowance of the Privilege Against Self Incrimination (1935) 19 MINN,. L. REV. 426;
Taft, The Administration of Criminal Law (1905) 15 YALE L. J. 1; Wigmore, fix-Secre-
tary Hiughes on the Privilege Against Self-Crimination (1925) 16 J. Clum. LAW &
CRIai. 165; Wartels and Pollitt, A Critical Comment on the Privilege Against Self-
Crinination (1929) 18 Ky. L. REV. 18. For an authoritative review of the entire subject,
see 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2250-2284.
2. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V. The privilege is to be found in the constitutions of all
except two states, Iowa and New Jersey. In these two it is part of the common law.
State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N. W. 935 (1902) ; Parker v. State, 61 N. J. L. 308,
39 AtI. 651 (1898). Variations in constitutional phraseology have not affected inter-
pretation of the scope of the privilege. 4 WIGIMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2252. Ap-
parently nothing in the Federal Constitution forbids excision or modification of the privi-
lege in the states. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
3. The wording of the Federal Constitution is typical: ". . . Nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U. S. CoNST. AMEND. V.
4. See note 1 supra. Bruce, The Right to Continent on the Failure of the Del endant
io Testify (1932) 31 MICH. L. REV. 226; Dunmore, Comment on Failure of Accused to
Testify (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 464; Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Tes-
tify (1932) 31 Micia. L. REV. 40; Note (1936) 50 HARV. L. REV. 356.
5. Until 1878 the accused was an incompetent witness in the federal courts. The
legislation removing his disability is typically worded: ". . . The person . . . charged
shall, at his own request but not otherwise, be a competent witness. And his failure to
make such request shall not create any presumption against him." 20 STAT. 30 (1878),
28 U. S. C. § 632 (1934).
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the witness stand with the duty to answer every admissible question which
an imaginative prosecutor can concoct.0 The choice to testify obliterates the
privilege; he who chooses to remain silent usually finds himself convicted.
7
No legislation can prevent the inevitable inference which the human mind
must draw from the spectacle of speechlessness in the face of accusation.
Inasmuch as such legislation exists, it would at least seem wise to require
the trial judge explicitly to instruct the jury that no adverse presumption
may arise from silence. Otherwise the statutory provision forbidding an
unfavorable inference from failure to testify is not merely unrealistic, but
completely meaningless. Such recently was the unanimous opinion of the
Supreme Court.8
That tribunal has sedulously avoided deciding whether it is violative of
constitutional sanction to alter the traditional practice and allow comment
by judge or prosecutor upon the prisoner's failure to testify.0 When the
issue has arisen elsewhere, it has generally been decided that such a change
in the usual practice is unconstitutional.10 This result seems open to question.
The normal practice of prohibiting unfavorable comment appears a gratuitous
statutory survival of the prisoner's complete incompetence to testify, rather
6. There are six distinct variations in attempting to fix the extent of the waiver of
the accused when he takes the stand. See 4 WIGMI)RE, EVIExCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2276(2).
The best view would seem to be that the waiver extends to all matters relevant to the
issue, thus excluding facts merely affecting credibility. State v. Wentworth, 65 Me. 234,
243 (1875). See (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 501.
7. -No statistical study appears to have been made, except in Ohio where the prose-
cutor may comment on the failure of the accused to testify. Dunmore, Comment on Fail-
vre of Accused to Testify (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 464. But there seems to be general
agreement that the silent defendant is usually convicted. See Bruce, The Right to Com-
ment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify, (1932) 31 'Micn. L. REv. V.6, 230;
Twix. FRoMc rME DIsTRrcr ATrORNEYS OFFICE (1939) 93, "Out of three hundred de-
fendants tried by judge Nott, twenty-three failed to take the stand . . . Of these,
twenty-one were convicted, one was acquitted, and as to one the jury disagreed."
8. Bruno v. United States. 60 Sup. Ct. 198 (U. S. 1939). No technical distinction
between inference and presumption seems to have been made, except insofar as the court
recognized the impossibility of legislating against the operation of the human mind.
Wigmore bases his argument against requiring the judge so to instruct the jury upon
this same impossibility. ". . . It is well enough to contrive artificial fictions for use by
lawyers, but to attempt to enlist the layman in the process of nullifying his own reasoning
powers is merely futile, and tends towards confusion and disrespect for the law's reason-
ableness.' 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2272.
9. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1903).
10. State v. Wolfe, 64 S. D. 178, 266 N. W. 116 (1936), 50 Hmnv. L. REV. 356. A
constitutional amendment was enacted in Ohio to allow such comment. Ohio Const.
Art. I, § 10. New Jersey permits unfavorable comment in the absence of a constitutional
provision with which to contend. Parker v. State, 61 N. j. L. 308, 39 Ad. 651 (1S93).
See Grantello v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 117, 121 (C. C. A. Sth, 1924): Anderson v.
State, 27 Wyo. 345, 365, 196 Pac. '1047, 1053 (1921). Contra: State v. Cleaves, 59 Me.
298 (1871).
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than a necessary corollary of the constitutional privilege." But the two have
become so associated that it may be said as a matter of judicial action, as
distinguished from theoretical accuracy, that the prohibition against comment
has generally become a component rule of the privilege, destructible only by
constitutional alteration. Permission of explicit unfavorable inference has
therefore made its way with difficulty.'
2
Extension to the prosecution of the power to call the defendant as a witness
is an extreme which has gained no foothold. Logically such a practice would
likewise appear not to violate the privilege,' 3 but probably no court would
permit it without constitutional amendment.' 4 Once under oath, the accused
could of course refuse to answer criminating questions, since the most tortu-
ous straining of concept could construct no waiver here. But the claim of
privilege before a jury would be tantamount to a formal confession of guilt.
The accused would in fact be under extreme pressure to testify fully.
Probably such extensions of the present generally adopted procedure are
pragmatically unnecessary and undesirable, despite their solid theoretical basis.
Under the present practice the accused is under sufficient pressure to testify.
Normally he will refrain only under extraordinary conditions. If he is inno-
cent of the crime charged, and the state's evidence is weak, he may prefer
to seek a directed verdict or an acquittal for failure of affirmative proof,
rather than risk the prejudice attaching to forced admissions of other extrane-
ous criminal conduct. Even if the case against him is strong, the probably
guilty habitual criminal will prefer the slender risk of escape to the com-
parative certainty of conviction by a jury before whom his guilt of other
crimes has been paraded. The existing possibility of the defendant's un-
availability for testimonial examination is a safeguard against frivolous prose-
cutions on insufficient affirmative evidence.'r
A lingering doubt as to whether the accused can be compelled to exhibit
his physical characteristics has happily abated; except for an occasional
11. See note 5 supra. Historically the privilege was limited to preventing direct,
actual compulsion. See Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 281, 292, 182 N. E. 865, 869 (1932). For
detailed investigations into the historical genesis of the privilege, see 4 WIGMora, E Vi-
DENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2250; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self In-
crimination Clause (1930) 29 MCrr. L. REV. 1; Pittman, The Colonial and Constitu-
tional History of the Prvilege Against Self Incrimination in America (1935) 21 VA. L.
REV. 763.
12. See note 10 supra.
13. The privilege in origin is merely one against compulsion of incriminating answers,
not against taking the witness stand. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2250.
14. For the cautious judicial attitude towards coercing the accused to become a wit-
ness, see Blair v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 715, 185 S. E. 900 (1936). (Juror asked for
benefit of accused's testimony, and he thereupon took the stand. Held, reversible error).
15. NlWigmore argues that "... Any system of administration which permits the
prosecution to trust habitually to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must
itself suffer morally thereby." 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2251.
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aberrancy, 16 the law is now settled that the privilege affects only verbal
evidence 7 But verbal evidence is not limited to oral testimony; it includes
likewise documentary evidence.' 8 Unless the accused is a corporation, he can
refuse to produce any incriminating document in his possession.19
These rules, in the few cases where they are of any effect whatsoever,
would seem on the whole to contribute to the orderliness of criminal pro-
cedure without greatly detracting from its efficiency. In the normal case,
when the defendant does become a witness, an appreciation of the purpose
of the privilege should induce reluctance to extend the doctrine of waiver
beyond its proper limits. Questions should not become admissible merely
because the witness is on trial for crime. The usual rules of evidence are
not waived when he takes the stand. A wise moderation in the trial court
is the best preventive of a criminal procedure of accusatory insistence, against
which the privilege was sought to guarantee.20
Means for complete excision of the privilege of the accused are frequently
at hand. One is extension of waiver to include failure to assert the privilege
in a previous proceeding concerning the subject of present litigation.21
16. Bethel v. State, 178 Ark. 277, 10 S. NV. (2d) 370 (1923) (taking of physical
examination) ; People v. Scott, 326 Il1. 327, 157 N. E. 247 (1927) (mental examination).
The one great exception is furnished by judicial welding of the privilege v.with the pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The result is the rule in the federal
courts and in a minority of the states holding that the privilege is violated by intro-
duction of evidence illegally acquired. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 293 (1921);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). See Coarin, The Suprcme Courts Cor-
struction of the Self Incrimination Clause (1930) 29 Micr. L. Rrv. 1. The limitations
and wisdom of this rule have been thoroughly discussed and are not dealt with in this
Comment.
17. Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 (1910); Ross v. State, 204 Ind. 231,
182 N. E. 865- (1932). 4 VIGmom, EviDENcE (2d ed. 1923) § 2263. Comment (1939)
53 akRv. L. REv. 285. The privilege is limited to oral or written statements required
under process as a witness and is not to be confused with the rule excluding involuntary
confessions. For a recent example of such confusion, see Matter of Schmidt v. Dist. Att'Y
of Monroe Co., 255 App. Div. 353, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 787 (4th Dep't 1938).
18. The rule is well settled everywhere. However, the document must be surren-
dered for a determination by the court of whether its contents actually are incriminating.
Brown v. United States, 276 U. S. 134 (1928); Corretjer v. Dranghorn, 83 F. (2d) 116
(C. C. A. 1st, 1937).
19. Around the only serious issue arising under this aspect of the privilege breaks a
hopeless conflict of authority. The problem is whether or not the privilege is violated by
a notice to the accused in open court to produce an incriminating writing in his posses-
sion. It would seem illogical to hold that the privilege is violated before it is asserted.
But like the analogy of refusing to permit the prosecution to call the accused as a wit-
ness, the better view appears to be a preference for reality rather than logic. Powell v.
Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S. E. 433 (1937) (cases collected).
20. Some courts appear to have made no effort to limit cross examination oi the
accused as to his guilt of other crimes. People v. Murel, 225 Mich. 499, 196 N. WN. 376
(1923); State v. Hale, 85 N. H. 403, 160 Adt. 95 (1932).
21. Thaniel v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 795, 111 S. E. 259 (1922); NMislamnins v.
Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 Pac. 411 (1899).
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Another is the simple device of classifying the case as a non-criminal action.
The defendant then can be called as a witness by. the prosecution and com-
pelled to be sworn. Thus, in proceedings involving deportation, 22 violation
of a city ordinance,2 alien land laws,2 4 abatement of a public nuisance 25
and recovery of a monetary penalty imposed by the state, 20 the government
has been allowed to call the defendant as a witness. If liability is non-criminal,
consistency would appear to require him to answer all proper questions relat-
ing thereto, since the answers would not be criminating.
27
II.
The defendant in a non-criminal action is in the situation of the ordinary
third party witness in a civil or criminal case, whose efforts to utilize the
privilege have given rise to a separate set of problems. Whether the con-
stitutional provision was originally intended to include a witness's common
law privilege not to criminate himself is highly conjectural. 28  But of the
complete present fusion of the witness's option with the traditional consti-
tutional guarantee there can be no doubt. Though protected by the identical
constitutional phraseology and governed by the same abstract definitions, the
privilege of the witness is quite distinct from that of the accused; -in scope,
in policy and in the areas of litigious conflict from which the case law has
been engendered.
It is now substantially settled that a witness may, under the privilege,
lawfully refuse to testify only concerning facts making him presently liable
to criminal prosecution in the same jurisdiction. There is no option to decline
22. United States ex reL. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149 (1923); Loufakis v.
United States, 81 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936) ; United States v. Parson, 22 F. Supp.
149 (S. D. Cal. 1938). But the civil nature of deportation proceedings should not pre-
vent a witness's proper exercise of the privilege, even though he be the prospective de-
portee. Graham v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 746 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938).
23. Milwaukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 274 N. W. 273 (1937).
24. People v. Shoichi Nakamura, 125 Cal. App. 268, 13 P. (2d) 805 (1932) (suit
by state for forfeiture of defendant's land).
25. People e.r rel. Moll v. Danziger, 238 Mich. 39, 213 N. W. 448 (1927) (premises
used for immoral purposes) ; State ex rel. Att'y Gen'l Lyon v. Riddock and Byrnes, 78
S. C. 286, 58 S. E. 803 (1907) (illegal sales of liquor).
26. Fleishman v. State, 91 S. W. (2d) 493, (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); People v. Des-
tro, 217 App. Div. 819, 217 N. Y. Stipp. 927 (4th Dep't 1926) semble.
27. There has occasionally been a tendency to compromise with consistency. Mil-
waukee v. Burns, 225 Wis. 296, 274 N. W. 273 (1937). Other proceedings typically
called civil are those for the revocation of licenses. In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac.
29 (1926); Johnson v. State Bar of Cal., 4 Cal. (2d) 744, 52 P. (2d) 928 (1936);
McIntosh v. State Bar of Cal., 211 Cal. 261, 294 Pac. 1067 (1930) ; State v. Brbwn, 218
Iowa 166, 253 N. W. 836 (1934).
28. Marshall, C. J., in the early leading case of In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 39
(C. C. Va. 1807) speaks of the witness's privilege as "a settled maxim of the law."
There is no reference to the Constitution.
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response which would reveal a liability only to civil redress. -0 Likewise, no
matter how great his moral guilt, a witness has no choice but to answer
concerning a crime for which he is now immune from prosecution, because
of trial ending in conviction or acquittal, a pardon or statutory immunity, or
the running of the statute of limitations."0 judicial confusion of the privilege
with that which permits refusal to respond when the answer would tend to
degrade has occasionally beclouded these settled principles.31 The latter
privilege is one allowable in the discretion of the trial court, and is restricted
to questions concerning a "collateral" matter; it has no constitutional sane-
tionY.
2
Whether liability to prosecution in another jurisdiction is an adequate basis
for assertion of the privilege is a question which would seem to have been
finally settled. The case of United States v. Murdock33 appears to decide
with sufficient clarity that the privilege refers only to criminal liability in
the same jurisdiction, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned.-" The
only difficulty arises in deciding whether the rule is ironclad. If it is based
on a limitation of power or jurisdiction," then there would seem to be no
possibility of exception. If, on the other hand, language in the opinions be
taken literally, the rule may possibly be based on the proposition that the
danger of prosecution by another sovereigu is too insubstantial and remote
to be taken seriously.36 If the presumption is rebuttable, then in cases where
the witness could show to the court's satisfaction that the danger of such
prosecution was imminent and substantial, he would be able successfully to
assert the privilege and refuse to answer the question. The ambiguity is at
least of sufficient substantiality to encourage occasional earnest argument by
counsel 3
7
29. See note 27 supra.
30. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896); Moore v. Back'us, 78 F. (2d) 571 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1935).
31. See Field, J., dissenting in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 631 (1896); In re
Sadleir, 85 P. (2d) 810 (Utah 1938).
32. Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 598 (1396).
33. 284 U. S. 141 (1931).
34. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73 (1916); United States v. Portale, 235
U. S. 27 (1914). It was held in Jack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372- (1905) that a state im-
munity statute which did not guarantee immunity from prosecution in the federal courts
was not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. But since the Court has held that
eradication of the entire privilege from a state constitution would likewise not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment, this case alone would not seem to have the force which some
commentators have given it. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1003).
35. Upon a strict application of the doctrine of two distinct sovereignties. King of
the Two Sicilies v. Willcox, 7 State Trials (x.s.) 1049, 106 (Ch. 1850) ; State v. Word,
99 \t 490, 134 A&L 697 (1926).
36. Tack v. Kansas, 199 U. S. 372 (1905); E.r parle Copeland, 91 Tex. Cr. 549, 240
S. WV. 314 (1922).
37. See N. Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1940, p. 15. col. 1 ; Feb. 28, 1940, p. 14, col. 4. Counsel
argued that a witness could assert the privilege in an XLRB investigation despite a fed-
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Further limitations upon the privilege of a witness are made possible by
availability of the familiar doctrine of waiver. While a witness of course
cannot, like the accused, be held to have waived the privilege when he takes
an oath to testify, since he is under the absolute duty to do that if he is sub-
poenaed, waiver can be constructed when in previous proceedings he has
voluntarily answered the questions to which he now pleads his privilege. The
courts employ the doctrine with a varying degree of willingness.38
How great an indication of criminal guilt must be involved in a possible
answer before it is within the ambit of the privilege, and in whose hands
lies the responsibility for making this decision, are the questions concerning
the witness's privilege which have most engrossed the attention of the courts.
In their usual statement of the principles which should govern, the illusion
of almost complete harmony is preserved. For a statement of the law, the
courts invariably turn to the. opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in
In re Willie, delivered during the course of Aaron Burr's trial. Willie,
who was Burr's confidential secretary, refused to answer whether he under-
stood the cipher in which a supposedly incriminating document was written.
His contention was that a possible affirmative answer would tend to indicate
guilt of misprision of treason. The ingredients of that crime are knowledge
of the treason and failure to make it known. Marshall decided that the
witness must answer the question, declaring that proof of understanding of
the cipher at the time of trial did not support an inference of understanding
at the time it was written. In concluding his opinion the Chief Justice
"settled" the law:
"The gentlemen of the bar will understand the rule laid down by
the court to be this: It is the province of the court to judge whether
any direct answer to the question which may be proposed will furnish
evidence against the witness. If such answer may disclose a fact
which forms a necessary and essential link in the chain of testimony,
which would be sufficient to convict him of any crime, he is not
bound to answer it so as to furnish matter for that conviction. In
such a case the witness must himself judge what his answer will be;
and if he say on oath that he cannot answer without accusing him-
self, he cannot be compelled to answer."3 9
To pretend that this statement of the law will automatically determine the
disposition of any but the clearest cases is ingenuous; at best it indicates the
eral immunity provision, because of substantial danger of prosecution by state authorities.
The witness was nevertheless compelled to answer, but apparently on the astonishing
ground that the federal act gave him immunity from state prosecution. See Shiras, J.,
dissenting in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 623 (1896).
38. Compare Bennett v. State, 68 Fla. 494, 67 So. 125 (1914), State v. Kimes, 152
Iowa 240, 132 N. 'V. 180 (1911), with Duckworth v. District Ct. of Woodbury Co., 220
Iowa 1350, 264 N. W. 715 (1936).
39. 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (C. C. Va. 1807).
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outlines of a general approach. Attempts to deduce from it a self-operating
set of rules have proved futile, in terms of the decided cases. 0
Two cases in the Supreme Court indicate a contradictory attitude. In
Counselman v. Hitchcock,4 it was decided that the privilege included more
than the option to refuse to give testimony which itself supplied the necessary
and essential link. Silence was permissible if an answer would provide clues
whereby the link could be forged. Those states which had held a more
stringent view were not slow to alter their course.4 A different point of view
is furnished by Mason v. United States,"3 where the witness had refused
to answer questions, an affirmative response to which would have indicated
his presence at a gambling table. The grand jury was investigating a charge
of gambling against six others. The Court held that the privilege could not
be availed of, since the danger of incrimination was "remote and insub-
stantial." Further, the Court decided that it should not interfere "unless
there has been a complete denial of a right guaranteed." These two decisions
indicate the verbal formulas which can be utilized.
Few jurisdictions have consistently adopted the extreme position of the
Mason case. A series of decisions following it in the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals" seems recently to have been modified.4 5 Most courts follow
more closely in the path of Counselman s,. Hitchcock. 0 The problem is no
doubt normally solved by instinctive decision in the trial court. It is thus
impossible to measure the current drift of attitude. Even from those cases
which are reported in appellate opinions, it is difficult to develop a conclu-
40. See State v. Thaden, 43 Minn. 253, 255, 45 N. AV. 447 (1890) : 4 WrcmoE, E%,r-
DEaCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2261, 2271; see Rapacz, Rides Govendiki the Allnrnee of the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1935) 19 Minx. L. Ray. 426.
41. 142 U. S. 547 (1892). The Court decided that a narrowly worded immunity
statute was an insufficient substitute for the privilege. Inevitably such decision also de-
cided the scope of the privilege. Immunity must be as broad as the privilege which it
supplants.
42. People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253, 68 N. E. 353 (1903) (cases
from other jurisdictions collected).
43. 244 U. S. 362 (1917).
44. United States v. Flegenheimer, 82 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); United
States v. Weinberg, 65 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 290 U. S. 675
(1933); Abrams v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); O'Connell V.
United States, 40 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; cf. Miller v. United States, 95 F. (2d)
492 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938) (witness compelled to testify to cohabitation with one accused
of white slavery). Yet victim can be guilty of conspiracy to violate fann Act. United
States v Holte. 236 U. S. 140 (1915). But ef. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112
(1932).
45. United States v. Zwillmann, 103 F. (2d) S02 (C. C. ,. 2d, 1940).
46. Rx pare Irvine, 74 Fed. 954 (S. D. Ohio 1896) ; Ex torle Berman, 105 Cal. App.
37, 287 Pac. 125 (1930) ; Ex parte Arvin, 232 Mo. App. 796, 112 S. W. (2d) 113 (19371 ;
Ex parte Tomassi, 104 Vt 34, 156 Atl. 533 (1931). But 4f. Ex Parte Bommarito, 270
Mfich. 455, 259 N. W. 310 (1935) ; In re Jennings, 154 Ore. 482, 59 P. (2d) 702 (1936)
(both parties relied on In re WTillie).
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sion. Each is disposed of in terms of its peculiar facts. The metaphorical
phraseology of In re Willie seems to state the law in practically every juris-
diction. Yet few courts, applying it, would compel Willie to answer if the
case came before them today. Under the impact of Counselman v. Hitchcock,
the chain has become a longer one. A formula more precise is elusive of
exact apprehension.
47
Actually most of the cases which appellate courts are called upon to decide
arise from a denial in the trial court of the claim of privilege by the witness,
and a consequent commitment for contempt on his continued refusal to
answer. The course of procedure regularly followed in the court of first
instance is indicated more exactly by In re Willie than are the criteria of
decision to be employed. The witness must first refuse to answer the question;
-for it is the answer, not the question, to which the privilege is addressed. 48
Upon his refusal, it becomes the duty of the judge to decide, on the nebulous
standards indicated, whether any direct answer will tend to incriminate the
witness. Only if it is clear "as a matter of law" that no direct answer to the
question asked could possibly do so, will the court order him to reply. Thus,
he who asserts that the response will not point to guilt, has the burden of
proof.49 In view of the scope encompassed in such crimes as conspiracy,
0
the process of decision occasionally requires devious and imaginative re-
search. 51 A careful review of the testimony previously adduced is normally
of great relevance. 2 If the court decides that no direct reply can possibly
criminate, the witness is ordered to answer. Upon his continued refusal, he is
in contempt. Since the facts constituting the contempt have all occurred in
47. "The question is, not whether by his answers the prosecution would be able per-
haps to get leads to other witnesses, but whether an answer to the particular question
would put the witness in danger." This seems an excellent if general statement of the
proper middle ground. In re Doyle, 42 F. (2d) 686 (S. D. N. Y. 1930), rev'd in open
court, 47 F. (2d) 686 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
48. Though it appears a witness is not in contempt for refusing to answer a qtueg-
tion improper on other grounds, even though an answer might not be covered by the
privilege asserted; such is certainly the case if the question is immaterial. Lindquist v.
Hayes, 22 Ohio App. 141, 153 N. E. 297 (1926).
49. Moore v. Backus, 78 F. (2d) 571 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
50. United States v. Holte, 236 U. S. 140 (1915): United States v. Kissel and Har-
ned, 218 U. S. 601 (1910). See Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy (1922) 35 HARM. L. REv. 393.
51. Miller v. United States, 95 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938). Courts have occa-
sionally displayed excessive imagination. Brady v. Brady, 71 S. W, (2d) 42, 47 (Mo.
1934).
52. It is usually impossible to judge whether a question requires an incriminating
answer, when removed from its context. For example, previous testimony might have
shown that the witness has already been convicted of the crime which he is asked to
admit. Conversely, a question apparently innocent when isolated might actually demand
a highly incriminating answer. To compel the witness to give his name might conceiv-
ably violate the privilege. Previous testimony might have proved that a man of his dis-
tinctive name was guilty of a criminal offense. People v. Conzo, 301 Il. App. 524, 23 N.
E. (2d) 210 (1939) ; United States v. Zwillmann, 108 F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
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open court, summary procedure is permissible.53 It would seem wise, how-
ever, to require the court to make complete and definite findings of fact,
recording the entire transcript of previous questions and answers, so that
judicial review may be an enlightened one." The presumption on appeal is
sometimes stated in favor of the trial court's decision,05 sometimes of the
contemptuous witness's privilege. 0
In any case where the option of refusal has been invalidly allowed by the
trial court, either party to the litigation should have a right to base an appeal
on such error.57 That the privilege of the witness is a personal one should
not deprive a party of the power to seek redress on appeal if he has been
wrongfully denied the right to cross examination, or the benefit of direct
testimony in his behalf. If the unwarranted failure to speak resulted in a
material omission, a new trial should be permitted.58 On the other hand,
the witness's failure to utilize the privilege cannot be complained of. The
privilege is for his benefit alone, and if he choose not to assert it, neither
party can object to his willingness to speak.52
It is obvious that the effect of allouing a witness to decline to answer
questions is not necessarily to handicap the prosecution in a criminal trial.
The case may be a civil action between two private litigantsScO Even if it is
a criminal proceeding, the testimony which the witness is permitted to with-
hold might, if compelled, have aided the defense, not the prosecution."' The
privilege of the witness fearful of incrimination represents a mollification of
the absolute duty to testify. Like the privilege which protects a client, a
penitent, a patient and a spouse, it is a compromise between the right of the
judicial process to search for truth and the right of the individual to be let
alone. To say that it hampers the discovery of crime would seem naive; such
53. United States v. Flegenheimer, 82 F. (2d) 751 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
54. People v. Conzo, 301 I1. App. 524, 23 N. E. (2d) 210 (1939).
55. 'Mason v. United States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917); Miller v. United States, 95 F.
(2d) 492 (C. C. A. 9th, 193) ; Russell v. United States, 12 F. (2d) 683, 692 (C. C. A.
6th, 1926) ; State v. Beery, 193 Minn. 550, 270 N. W. 600 (1936).
56. People v. Conzo, 301 Il1. App. 524. 23 N. E. (2d) 210 (1939); E.x parte Arvin,
112 S. W. (2d) 113 (Mo. 1937); cf. United States v. Zwillmann, 103 F. (2d) F02 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1940).
57. Alder v. Commonwealth, 277 Ky. 136, 125 S. W. (2d) 986 (1939); Brady v.
Brady, 71 S. NV. (2d) 42, 46 (Mo. 1934); State v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 .N. E. 135
(1913).
58. Commonwealth v. Tracey, 8 A. (2d) 622 (Pa. 1939).
59. Nor should either party be permitted to object even if the witness is wrongfully
compelled to testify. Parker v. Board of Dental Exam., 216 Cal. 285, 14 P. (2d) 67
(1932); Orm v. State, 38 Ohio App. 171, 175 N. E. 876 (1930).
60. Pennsylvania Tank Line v. Jordan, 341 III. 94, 173 X. r. 181 (1930) ; Brady V.
Brady, 71 S. W. (2d) 42, 46 (Mo. 1934).
61. Coile v. United States, 100 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Alder v. Com-
monwealth, '277 Ky. 136, 125 S. XV. (2d) 9836 (1939): Commonwealth v. Tracey, 8 A.
(2d) 622 (Pa. 1939).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
a view attaches a disproportionate importance to the accidental admissions
which might be forthcoming if the privilege did not exist. Indeed, the presence
of the witness's privilege may benefit the prosecution in many cases. A witness
secure in the knowledge that he need not answer incriminating questions will
less frequently be hostile, recalcitrant or unavailable.
Yet it would seem equally obvious that a persistence of refusal to speak
may work substantial injustice. The law attempts to strike no balance between
the need for the testimony and the veniality of the crime of which the witness
may be guilty. The hypothetical extreme is that of the sole eyewitness guilty
of a trifling infraction. The right to property, liberty or life may depend on
his answers, yet any which might tend to prove him liable to present prose-
cution, he is privileged to withhold. Nor does the law investigate the motive
behind the assertion of privilege. There is no sanction against simulation.
The sole purpose of refusal may be a desire to pervert the ends of justice,
but if the answer would tend to prove guilt, bad faith cannot be a subject
of inquiry.(2 Despite the flexibility of the doctrine of In re Willie, the privi-
lege of the witness on occasion presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
legal process.
III.
It is in their encounter with the inquisitorial machinery of the state that
these rules engender a tangled complex of difficulty. The preliminary in-
vestigation by a magistrate or commissioner is still followed in many states
by grand jury indictment before trial.6 3 In the case of a specific charge
against a particular person, such proceedings, whether by information or
indictment, are apt to be summary, and largely in the control of the prose-
cuting officer. The accused is bound over for trial if the prima facie case
against him indicates "probable cause."
As a matter of practice, the prospective defendant is not generally sub-
poenaed for questioning. Whether it would be unconstitutional to interro-
gate him is a problem which has troubled the courts unduly. 4 It would seem
clearly that the privilege is not thus violated. Even if the Supreme Court's
gratuitous dictum that a grand jury proceeding is a "criminal case"0 6 be
accepted, the disability of the prosecution to call the accused at trial is not
properly imposed by constitutional sanction. 0 The compulsion of reality
62. United States v. Herron, 28 F. (2d) 122 (N. D. Cal. 1928).
63. Though in almost half of them it has completely disappeared. See Dession, From
Indictment to Inform tion-Iinplications of the Shift (1932) 42 YA L. J. 163.
64. United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897) ; State v. Kemp, 9 A.
(2d) 63 (Conn. 1939); State ex rel. Hemmings v. Coleman, 137 Fla. 80, 187 So. 793
(1939) (cases collected) ; State v. Gardner, 88 Minn. 130, 92 N. W. 529 (1902) ; People
v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908).
65. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547, 562 (1892). A witness can, of
course, assert the privilege in a civil case. See note 60 supra.
66. See note 13 supra.
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which imposes that disability is not present in preliminary proceedings of
inquiry. 7 Having been subpoenaed and sworn, the suspect could of course
refuse to answer any question falling within the constitutional penumbra.s
If the machinery of preliminary investigatory procedure were made appro-
priate to the orderly questioning of the suspect, a patent defect in criminal
procedure would be remedied. The accused would benefit by an opportunity
to rebut or e-x-plain the prima facie case against him, and the scope of pre-
liminary investigation would be more ptirposive. A criminal trial, resulting
in expense to the state and disgrace to the defendant, might often be avoided.
That the privilege against self-incrimination invites a use of the third
degree is the most vociferous and superficially persuasive argument against
it.09 Assuming without inquiry that there is an inevitable connection between
judicial procedure and police morale, it would seem that attack is more
properly directed towards the failure to provide at any stage in criminal
proceedings an opportunity for judicial examination of the suspect. Ques-
tioning of the man suspected is inevitable.70 It would seem more appropriate
that such investigation be undertaken in the atmosphere of a court of law
rather than in the back room of a precinct station. If such procedure were
inaugurated, there would be considerably less pressure upon the judiciary to
limit the rule against coercion of confession.'
Since the present procedure does not provide for any orderly judicial
investigation of the suspect, it is usually true that he is called to testify only
under conditions of abuse.72 Summoned, often from jail, to appear and
testify before an ex parte and sometimes secret inquisition, without benefit
of counsel, uninformed of the charge against him, and ignorant of his option
to refuse response, it is not surprising that his plight has induced some courts
to call it unconstitutional to subpoena him at all.73 But even those juris-
dictions which have accepted this emotionally attractive thesis have rarely
allowed it to become subject to abuse. Thus if the defendant appear volun-
67. See note 14 supra.
68. State v. Kemp, 9 A. (2d) 63 (Conn. 1939). He would have the privilege of an
ordinary witness.
69. See Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Crifnination (19210)
13 CORN. L. Q. 211.
70. 'In actual practice, from the time a man is arrested until arraignment he is
quizzed with a view to inducing him to admit his offense or give some evidence that may
help convict him." TRAix, FROM TE DIsTRIcT ATORI'.'YS OFFICE (1939) 36.
71. This rule is not to be confused with the privilege against self incrimination. See
note 17 supra.
72. United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897) ; Boone v. People, 143
Il. 440, 36 N. E. 99 (1894) ; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 51, 118 S. W. (2d) 140
(1938) ; People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 19031 ;
State v. Hoffman, 53 S. D. 182, 220 N. IV. 615 (1928). See People v. Ferola, 215 X. Y.
285, 109 N. E. 500 (1915) (coroner's inquest).
73. See note 72 supra. Contra: Williamson v. State, 77 P. (2d) 1193 (Okla. 1933).
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tarily, he has waived the privilege.74 If the indictment is brought on distinct
and unconnected evidence, there is no right to have it quashed: "An uncon-
stitutional interrogation of an accused does not extend to him either a pardon
or a perpetual grant of immunity concerning the crime involved."1 If he
be indicted or presented for perjury before the grand jury, he cannot assert
his innocence on the subtle theory that he was not under oath. 70
Thus limited, the doctrine would appear a useful, if theoretically unsup-
portable technique to rectify iniquities in inquisitorial procedure. Departure
from orthodoxy is sometimes justified. One abuse which even orthodox
courts usually find means of prohibiting is utilization of the preliminary
investigating process to gather evidentiary material for the purpose of inde-
pendent litigation concurrently in progress elsewhere.
77
In investigations undertaken, not to connect a particular person with a
particular offense, but for the more general purpose of discovering whether
crime has been committed, and if so, by whom, those subsequently indicted
have occasionally sought to escape trial by the claim that they were called
as witnesses during the course of the investigation. 78 Extension of the doc-
trine to this situation would seem unwise. 79 It would greatly limit the scope
of such general investigation, if any witness questioned during its course
were immune from prosecution. On the other hand, abuse of such a pro-
ceeding is possible. John Doe is sometimes made the object of complaint
when the real suspect is known. This use of a purportedly general investiga-
tion for the very purpose of evading the absolute prohibition against ques-
tioning the known suspect in those jurisdictions where such is the rule would
seem to require the same judicial disfavor.80
74. Mulloncy v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 1st, 1935) (a question for
trial jury) ; State v. Comer, 157 Ind. 611, 62 N. E. 452 (1902) ; Frost v. Commonwealth,
258 Ky. 709, 81 S. W. (2d) 583 (1935); State v. Carroll, 160 La. 199, 106 So. 782
(1926) ; State v. McDaniel, 336 Mo. 656, 80 S. W. (2d) 185 (1935).
75. State ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S. D. 162, 257 N. W. 113 (1934), (1935) 48 HAIv.
L. Rv. 861.
76. State v. Cox, 87 Ohio St. 313, 101 N. E. 135 (1913); Cf. People v. Reiss, 255
App. Div. 509, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 209 (1st Dep't 1938). Contra: People v. Bermel, 71
Misc. 356, 128 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
77. Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W. D. N. Y. 1923); In re
Nat. Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219 (N. D. Ohio 1922) ; cf. State v. Corteau, 198
Minn. 433, 270 N. W. 144 (1936).
78. United States v. Price, 163 Fed. 904 (S. D. N. Y. 1908); United States v.
Kimball, 117 Fed. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1902); State v. Kemp, 9 A. (2d) 63 (Conn. 1939);
Commonwealth v. Bolger, 229 Pa. 597, 79 Atl. 113 (1911).
79. In re Lemon, 15 Cal. App. (2d) 82, 59 P. (2d) 213 (1936); State v. Kemp,
9 A. (2d) 63 (Conn. 1939) ; State ex rel. Hemmings v. Coleman, 137 Fla. 80, 187 So.
793 (1939) (cases collected). See (1931) 15 MI-,qNN. L. REv. 344.
80. People v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 111 N. Y. Supp. 133 (1st Dep't 1908)
State v. Smith, 56 S. D. 238, 228 N. W. 240 (1929) ; State v. Hoffman, 53 S. D. 182,
220 N. W. 615 (1928). But cf. In re Black, 47 F. (2d) 542 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; State
ex rel. Poach v. Sly, 63 S. D. 162, 257 N. W. 113 (1934).
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In the case of assertion of his privilege by a witness before such agencies,
substantive questions of some difficulty are occasionally suggested. One such
may arise if the witness claim privilege in response to questions which he
has previously answered before the investigating body, though the questions
themselves seem to suggest no possible incriminating response. The claim is
based on fear of incrimination of perjury. If the previous answer were false,
a true answer now would have such effect. A continued false answer might
supply the elements of wilfulness or materiality lacking in the previous testi-
mony. When the issue has arisen, the privilege has been denied.8 ' The danger
of punishment for perjury before such a body is substantial, especially in a
jurisdiction which habitually utilizes the contempt power as an alternative
to the more uncertain process of a criminal trial for perjury s Yet denial
of the option of refusal appears sound. The privilege would seem properly
to refer only to factual matter denoted by the words, not to the act of uttering
them. The distinction is a tenuous one, not clearly drawn by the courts which
have had to decide the question.83
Whether refusal to claim the privilege operates as a waiver in subsequent
proceedings raises problems which have been considered.8 4 A more difficult
issue is suggested by successful assertion of the privilege. If at trial the
witness, now a defendant, denies his guilt in answer to questions to which
he has previously claimed the privilege, proof of his previous claim has been
admitted to impeach. The practice inflicts a severe penalty upon him who
asserts a constitutional right, yet the doctrine of waiver would seem to make
the practice permissible on cross examination.85
Vexatious problems of procedure also arise when the witness asserts his
privilege before the grand jury. The investigation is conducted in seclusion,
yet it is the judge who must decide whether the answer sought is within
the ambit of the privilege. Upon his initial refusal to answer, it is necessary,
therefore, to bring the witness before the court for preliminary disposition.
If it is decided that no possible answer will incriminate, he is returned to
the grand jury room with instructions to answer the question. If his con-
tumacy continues, he is presented for contempt.80
81. Loubriel v. United States, 9 F. (2d) 807 (C. C. _. 2d, 1926) ; People v. Kramer,
14 N. Y. S. (2d) 161 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1939). But cf. People ex rel Falk v. Sher-
iff, 258 N. Y. 437, 180 N. E. 110 (1932).
82. Schleier v. United States, 72 F. (2d) 414 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; United States v.
Appel, 211 Fed. 495 (S. D. N. Y. 1913). But cf. Ex tarte Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378
(1919); Blim v. United States, 6S F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
83. See note 81 supra. An immunity statute does not extend to perjury. Gliehkstein
v. United States, 222 U. S. 139 (1911).
84. See note 38 supra.
85. Compare Raffel v. United States, 271 U. S. 494 (1926), with People V. Luclmian,
254 App. Div. 694, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 864 (2d Dep't 1938).
86. This procedure is uniformly indicated in the reported cases. See, e.g., Abrams
v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 2d. 1933).
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The procedure at the subsequent hearing is confounded by irreconcilable
principles, not always perceived by the courts. The contempt is undoubtedly
criminal,8 7 and, though "in the presence of the court" for the purpose of
giving statutory jurisdiction,8 8 still not in open court. 89 Therefore a hearing
in the nature of a criminal trial must be had.90 The witness has a right to
be informed of the charge against him and to the advice of counsel.91 He
must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and he cannot be required
to criminate himself.92 Such a procedure would seem to require that in
order to manipulate the formula of In re Willie the court must be scrupulously
informed of every detail of testimony which the witness delivered prior to
his assertion of privilege, and to the substance of all other relevant evidence
which had been adduced. Yet the secrecy of grand jury proceedings is tra-
ditionally inviolable.98 The dilemma is thus complete. If secrecy is preserved,
a proper hearing cannot be had, unless the witness accuse himself, which
he cannot be required to do.
Most courts have solved the problem by ignoring it.94 But in the reported
cases, it is generally grand jury secrecy which sub silentio has been sacri-
ficed. 95 This would seem a proper result. The grand juror's oath of silence
has been called a conditional one. 6 The proceedings in which he participates
are subject to judicial scrutiny when the interests of justice require. 97 An
impelling reason for the traditional refusal to permit inspection of grand jury
87. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
88. Cf. Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267 (1889).
89. Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517 (1925).
90. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
91. Lang v. United States, 55 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
92. Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42 (1924) ; United States v. Balaban, 26
F. Supp. 491 (N. D. Ill. 1939); Root v. MacDonald, 260 Mass. 344, 157 N. E. 684
(1927). Contra: State ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N. W. 282 (1937).
93. McKinney v. United States, 199 Fed. 25 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); United States v.
American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D. D. C. 1939); United States v. Violon,
173 Fed. 501 (S. D. N. Y. 1909); In re Opinion of the Justices, 232 Mass. 601, 123 N. E.
100 (1919) ; People v. Miller, 257 N. Y. 54, 177 N. E. 306 (1931).
94. There has been but slight discussion of the difficulties caused by this conflict of
doctrine. See United States v. Zwillmann, 108 F. (2d) 802, 803 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940);
Spector v. Allen, 281 N. Y. 251, 253, 22 N. E. (2d) 360, 363 (1939) ; O'Connell v.
United States, 40 F. (2d) 201, 207 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) (dissenting opinion).
95. Typically the opinions contain a long transcript of the testimony before the grand
jury. Abrams v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 22 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; O'Connell v. United
States, 40 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930) ; United States v. McGovern, 1 F. Supp. 568
(S. D. N. Y. 1932), aff'd, 60 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). But cf. Mason v. United
States, 244 U. S. 362 (1917) ; People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219, 38 N. E.
303 (1894) (witness committed for contempt upon prosecutor's statement and without
further inquiry).
96. Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1908).
97. Metzler v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E. D. Pa. 1933) ; United States v. Silverthorne, 265
Fed. 853 (IV. D. N. Y. 1920). See Kidd, Secrecy vs. Inspection of Grand Jury Minutes
(1928) 6 THE PAxE. No. 1, p. 4.
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minutes would appear to be judicial reluctance to implement the arsenal of
technicalities by which indictments may be quashed.03 That consideration is
absent in the case of a witness presented for contempt. If there are impelling
reasons in an individual case why the grand jury's secrecy should not be
violated, then the witness ought not to be committed for contempt.P3
Whatever its utility as an instrument of formal indictment, the grand jury
has largely recaptured its vigor as a body of general inquiry.10 0 The restric-
tions above might at first appear substantially to reduce the effectiveness of
its broad powers of investigation. In actuality, the problem has been largely
met. The potential obstruction of the privilege to general investigation has
been overcome by immunity statutes, withdrawal of the privilege from cor-
porations and publicity.
Grant of legislative immunity is usually accorded to erase the privilege in
cases inevitably the subject of general investigation?10' A witness offered
immunity from prosecution cannot refuse to speak, so long as the immunity
is "as broad as" the privilege surrendered in exchange. Thus since Counsel-
mnan v. Hitchcock he must be assured that no clues uncovered by his testimony
form the basis of a future prosecution for any matter to which he testifies.10
But immunity need not, and probably can not, prevent prosecution by another
sovereign.10 3 The phraseology of the statutes is uniform,'04 and their inter-
pretation fairly consistent. There is a tendency to liberality of construction
when the witness is claiming his privilege ;les to stringency when he pleads
98. United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 429 (D. D. C. 1939);
United States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 158 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
99. This appears to be substantially the holding of United States v. Zvillmann, 103
F. (2d) 802 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). Cf. People v. Conzo, 301 Il. App. 524; 23 N. E. (24)
210 (1939).
100. Where the grand jury has been entirely abolished, other agencies have been given
its broad investigative functions. See Dession and Cohen, The Inqudsitorial Functions of
Grand Juries (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 687.
101. Misdeeds perfected without outcry, such as conspiracy and bribery, are typically
subjects of general investigation. Immunity is almost invariably granted to witnesses
testifying to this type of wrong. See 4 WIGIORE, EvmENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2231 (im-
munity statutes collected). Crimes of violence and of more forthright dishonesty will
normally come to light without investigatory proceedings.
102. 142 U. S. 547 (1892). See Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931).
See note 46 supra.
103. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
104. The phraseology approved in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 593 (1896) has
become a model: "No person shall be excused from attending and testifying . . . But
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which he may testify or produce evi-
dence . . ." Modem statutes usually make this alteration: "concerning which he is
compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or
produce evidence." See, e.g., NATioNAL LUoa REATm=ozs AcT, 49 STAT. 449 (1935)
§ 11 (3), 29 U. S. C. 161(3) (1939).
105. Ex parte Critchlow, 11 Cal. (2d) 751, 81 P. (2d) 966 (1933); Matter of Sey-
mour v. Lardn, 254 App. Div. 215, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 428 (4th Dep't 1938); cf. United
1075
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
his immunity in bar.106 It would seem that there must be a claim of privilege
before immunity be granted; without assertion, the privilege is waived. Im-
munity is given only in exchange for express surrender, even though it be
mandatory. It is not intended as a gratuity.10 7 Cases deviating from this
principle are few, and are based often on discrepancies in statutory phrase-
ology1
08
It appears, however, that immunity must be granted by formal statutory
enactment. Other attempts to compel response by withdrawing the danger
of future prosecution have been held insufficient.100 Such inflexibility seems
unwarranted. When objects of investigation unforeseen by the legislature
arise, the inquisitor is powerless in the face of persistence in silence. The
solution would seem to be a statutory grant to the investigator, and to the
prosecutor at trial, of power to extend immunity to any witness asserting
his privilege. To forestall potential abuse, permission of the court might
well be required.
The second great lubricant to investigation is the complete withdrawal
of the privilege from corporations. 110 The theoretical basis for excluding them
from protection is questionable ;11 its practical necessity is apparent. Evidence
of corporate wrongdoing is usually to be found only in corporate records.
Their exclusion from the protection of the privilege is limited to the case
of a subpoena requiring the corporation to produce its books.112 However,
States v. Weinberg, 65 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ; People v. Roekola, 346 Ill. 27,
178 N. E. 384 (1931).
106. People v. Clenner, 159 Misc. 860, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1069 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; People
v. Grossman, 145 Misc. 781, 262 N. Y. Supp. 66 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; cf. Heike v. United
States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913).
107. United States v. Mary Helen Coal Corp., 24 F. Supp. 50 (E. D. Ky. 1938);
People v. Clenner, 159 Misc. 860, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1069 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
108. United States v. Goldman, 28 F. (2d) 424 (D. Conn. 1928); People v. Finkel
stein, 299 Ill. App. 363, 20 N. E. (2d) 290 (1939).
109. The witness need not answer though he is promised immunity by prosecutor or
grand jury. Ex parte Irvine, 74 Fed. 954 (S. D. Ohio 1896); People v. Rockola, 339
Ill. 474, 171 N. F. 559 (1930) ; Duckworth v. District Ct. of Woodbury Co., 220 Iowa
1350, 264 N. W. 715 (1936). Yet if he does testify, he has an "equitable right to a par-
don." Whiskey Cases, 99 U. S. 594 (1878); People v. Bogolowski, 326 111. 253, 157 N.
E. 181 (1927). And he need not "accept" an executive pardon. Burdick v. United States,
236 U. S. 79 (1915). But cf. Biddle v. Perowich, 274 U. S. 480 (1927). Immunity by
legislative resolution, as distinguished from legislation, has also been held insufficient to
extinguish the privilege. Matter of Doyle, 257 N. Y. 244, 177 N. E. 489 (1931). But
see In re Hearing before Joint Legislative Committee, 187 S. C. 1, 196 S. E. 164 (1938).
110. Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911) ; In re Investigation Conducted
by the Att'y Gen'l, 27 F. Supp. 997 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
111. See McKenna, J., dissenting in Wilson v. United States, 221 U. S. 361, 386
(1911).
112. Dreier v. United States, 221 U. S. 394 (1911) ; Wilson v. United States, 221
U. S. 361 (1911). Though of course a corporate officer when called upon to testify could
not plead the corporation's privilege even if one existed, since the privilege is a personal
one. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90 (1906) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
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the limitation seems narrower than it is. Through such books the individual
guilt of many can be investigated.113 An issue is raised in the situation of
a corporate officer required to testify only in identification of the corpora-
tion's records which have been subpoenaed. It would seem that a recent
case holding his prosecution was barred by an immunity statute is errone-
ous.114 No matter how broad the statute, it should not apply. Immunity
statutes can have no effect upon a corporation. If the privilege is alsent,
such a statute is irrelevant. Since the officer personally was required to
testify to nothing criminating, the statute could not protect him. Immunity
is purchased only by expressly foregoing the privilege.110 On the other hand,
it would seem ridiculous to allow divestment of the privilege merely because
the witness was called "as a corporate officer." 116
A final weapon in the hands of the investigator is public opinion. If those
under investigation lay claim to even the slightest rectitude in the community,
reluctance to assert the privilege will vary in direct ratio to the amount of
public interest in the investigation. Claim of privilege reeks of the police
court and the jail. By the same token it is usually possible to secure an
express waiver of immunity, if such a statute would otherwise apply.1 17 There
have been recently more formal reflections of the low popular regard for the
claim of privilege. In California, its assertion by a police officer was held a
sufficient basis for his removal.118 In New York, a constitutional amend-
ment has made waiver of immunity a condition of tenure of public office.110
An appellate court of that state recently held that claim of privilege by a
lawyer in a proceeding investigating unethical practices was an adequate
ground for disbarment.'2 °
These tools are all at the disposal of administrative tribunals. Such agencies
are therefore rarely troubled by the restraining influence of the privilege.
They are invariably equipped with immunity statutes.'-" Typically, they are
concerned with regulating corporations.2 - Unlike a grand jury, which must
find a way of escaping its tradition of secrecy, they are adopted to take full
113. The privilege is withdrawn even from records of a defunct corporation in pos-
session of those under suspicion of guilt. Wheeler v. United States, 226 U. S. 478 (1913);
cf. Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74 (1913).
114. People v. Finkelstein, 299 Ill. App. 363, 20 N. E. (2d) 290 (1939).
115. See note 107 supra. Cf. Heike v. United States, -227 U. S. 131 (1913).
116. United States v. Goldman, 28 F. (2d) 424 (D. Conn. 1928).
117. This is the invariable practice in anti-trust prosecutions. Communication to Y.%tz
LAW JouRNAL from Dep't of Justice, Anti-Trust Division, Mard 1, 1940.
118. Christal v. Police Comm. of San Francisco, 9S Cal. App. Dec. 73, 92 P. (2d)
416 (1939), 28 CALrF. L. REv. 94.
119. N. Y. CosT. ART. 1, § 6.
120. Mlatter of Ellis, N. Y. L. J., Feb. 13, 1940, p. 675, col. 1.
121. People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 12 P. (2d) 1078 (1932); .Mouser V. Public
Util. Comm. of Ohio, 124 Ohio St. 425, 179 N. E. 133 (1931).
122. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v. I. C. C., 221 U. S. 612 (1911); In re Verser-Clay C,.,
98 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 10th, 1938).
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advantage of the compulsion of publicity. Other escapes from the privilege
belong peculiarly to administrative agencies. If information is collected with-
out the aid of a subpoena, the privilege is usually held not to apply, even
though punitive sanctions against withholding the information are compel-
ling.128 If records or reports are required to be kept, or filed with the agency,
there can on familiar analogies be no claim against the use of incriminating
evidence which such records may subsequently reveal.12 4 Administrative pen-
alties have been called civil,' 2 5 and the agency itself non-judicial, 2 0 for the
purpose of escaping the incidents of the privilege.
Use of every possible device to avoid entanglement of administrative agen-
cies with any aspect of the privilege against self crimination would seem
justified. Their purpose and form are not amenable to its injunctions. The
ideal of an expert personnel, utilizing untried sanctions to the end not of
punishment, but protection and regulation, is foreign to the atmosphere which
begot the privilege. 127 Paucity of litigation would indicate that escape from
entanglement has been successful.
Around the privilege against self incrimination has sounded a long and
violent controversy. 128 Its clamor has been out of all proportion to the con-
troversy's significance. By its terms the privilege protects only the guilty.
Yet to say for that reason that it should be eradicated is naive. The law
does not recognize subjective innocence or guilt; both are matters of objective
proof.'2 9 On the other hand, those who would defend it need not conjure
up the spectre of the innocent man convicted. That is an unreal dream.1 0
Where the privilege might have caused substantial harm, it has been avoided.
Correction of the injustices that it continues sometimes to cause can be
made by legislative adjustment. On the whole the privilege itself, in most
of its many aspects, seems well worth preserving. It "is best defended not
as an unchangeable principle of universal justice but as a law proved by
experience to be expedient."'18 1
123. Sherwin v. United States, 268 U. S. 369 (1925); Cannan v. United States, 19
F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927) (but subsequent use of evidence in criminal trial is
barred by rule against involuntary confessions) ; cf. People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548,
12 P. (2d) 1078 (1932).
124. People v. Creeden, 281 N. Y. 413, 24 N. E. (2d) 105 (1939) ; cf. United States
v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1927).
125. See note 27 supra.
126. People v. Clenner, 159 Misc. 860, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1069 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
127. See Lilienthal, The Power of Governmental Agencies to Compel Testimony
(1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 694.
128. See note 1 supra.
129. See People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219, 38 N. E. 303 (1894). The
court there assumed that the witness was innocent, but permitted him to refuse testimony
which might build a circumstantial case against him.
130. See United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
131. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 113 (1908).
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